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I.

C.

MASCOLO*

INTRODUCTION

In the landmark decision of Payton v. New York! the United
States Supreme Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals
and held that warrantless entry into a suspect's home to effect a
warrantless felony arrest, when done in the absence of either
consent or exigent circumstances, 2 is unreasonable under the
fourth amendment. 3 The New York Court of Appeals had held that
police officers could effect a warrantless and forcible entry of a sus
pect's home to arrest him, in the absence of exigent circumstances,
upon a showing of probable cause. 4 The court of appeals based its
decision on the "substantial difference" between an intrusion which
attends a search of the premisess and one which attends an entry
to arrest a suspect, the latter being less objectionable. Char
* Research attorney, Office of Judicial Education, Judicial Department, State of
Connecticut; member of the Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars; Editor-in
Chief of the CONNECTICUT BAR JOURNAL, 1969-1973; current member of the
CONNECTICUT BAR JOURNAL Editorial Board; B.A., Wesleyan University, 1949;
L.L.B., Georgetown University, 1952. The opinions expressed herein are those of the
author alone.
\ 1. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
2. [d. at 576, 589-90.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per
sons or things to be seized.
4. People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 310, 380 N.E.2d 224, 228-29, 408 N.Y.S.2d
395,399 (1980), rev'd sub nom. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
5. [d. at 310,380 N.E.2d at 228, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
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acterizing a warrantless entry to arrest as "a routine felony arrest, "6
the Supreme Court reasoned that an arrest and a search both re
sult in entry of a private home: any differences between the two
regarding intrusiveness are merely of degree rather than of kind.
Thus, the Court concluded that both an arrest and a search for
incriminating evidence implicate the same privacy interests under
the fourth amendment7 and require the "same level of constitu
tional protection. "8 This protection is provided by the warrant re
quirement of the fourth amendment.
While the Payton Court sanctioned warrantless entries under
certain 'circumstances, it failed to address 9 the specific kinds of
emergencies that must exist before warrantless entries to arrest
suspects are constitutionally valid. 10 This article. analyzes the emer
gency entry issue and evaluates the circumstances when exigent
entries are lawful. First, it reviews the general conditions which
justify an emergency entry in the absence of a warrant. Second, it
analyzes the specific criteria supporting warrantless entries. Third,
it· reviews the unannounced entry doctrine which requires officers
to announce their authority and purpose prior to all entries, even
those supported by a warrant. Finally, it concludes that courts
·shouldassess warrantless police conduct under the totality of the
circumstances approach since that approach best accommodates the
competing policies of privacy and efficient law enforcement.

II. CRITERIA FOR EMERGENCY ENTRY
Law is a code of rules governing human conduCt in a civilized
society. One such rule, the rule of reasonableness, is embodied in
the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. The con
cept of reasonableness under the fourth amendment does not lend
6. 445 U.S. at 591.
7. Id. at 589-90. Furthermore, arrests and searc~es are governed by the same
constitutional principles and the same standard of reasonableness. [d. See Sabbath v.
United States, 391 y.S. 585, 588-89 (1968); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301,
306,308-09 (1958).
8. 445 U.S. at 588. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court reaffirmed the pri
macy of the warrant requirement in the home. [d. at 585-90; see United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561, 565 (1976) (dictum); United States v. United
States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
9. Another unresolved issue is whether a law enforcement officer has the au
thority to enter the home of a third party to arrest a suspect in the absence of exigent
circumstances. For an analysis of this issue, see Steagald v. United States, 101 S.
Ct. 1642 (1981); Mascolo, Arrest Warrants and Search Warrants: The Seizure of a
Suspect in the Home of a Third Party, 54 CONN. B.J. 299 (1980).
10. 445 U.S. at 583.
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itself to "precise definition or mechanical application."l1 It requires
a balancing of the need to search or seize against the invasion of
privacy that the search or seizure entails. In assessing the reason
ableness of search and seizure activity under the fourth amend
ment, courts have considered the following factors: The justification
for initiating an intrusion; the scope and degree of intrusion; the
manner of execution; and the locale in which the search or seizure
is conducted. 12 Ultimately, the standard of reasonableness for
fourth amendment purposes is determined by assessing both the
invasion of the individual's privacy interests and the "promotion of'
legitimate governmental interests" through effective law enforce
ment. 13 This assessment requires an accommodation between two
conflicting interests: The individual's right to be free from arbi
trary governmental intrusion and society's need for effective law en
forcement. 14

Because the fourth amendment establishes a standard of rea
sonableness, it operates as a limitation upon the official exercise of
power. 1S By imposing a standard of reasonableness upon the exer
cise of discretion by law enforcement officers the fourth amend
ment protects the security and privacy of the individual against ar
bitrary intrusions. 1s The standard of reasonableness requires that
the facts relied upon to justifY an intrusion "be capable of measure
ment against'an objective standard.' "17 This ensures that the indi
vidual's privacy interests are not subject to the discretionary mercy
of law enforcement officials. 1s
11. 'Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
12. Id, See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
13. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (footnote omitted); see United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976).
14. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1972)
(electronic surveillance improper in absence of warrant despite need to protect do
mestic security).
15. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971); see
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 353, 400
(1974).
16. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); see Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
17. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (footnote omitted).
18. ld, at 654-55; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,532 (1967); Aguilar
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 1l0-1l (1964); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,
455-56 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); see Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886); Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1153,
1167 (C.P. 1763); 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 141-42 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel
eds. 1965); Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 396.
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A fundamental tenet of fourth amendment jurisprudence is
that the individual's "'legitimate expectations of privacy' "19 are
most pronounced in the home. 20 To ensure fulfillment of these ex
pectations, the authors of the amendment erected certain barriers
to forcible and warrantless entries into the home by police offi
cers.21 The major barrier is the requirement of a warrant. 22 Since
the warrant requirement is particularly strong in the home set
ting,23 the Supreme Court has held that warrantless arrests within
a private residence are "presumptively unreasonable."24 There are
certain "specifically established and well-delineated exceptions"25
to the Court's general command for a warrant. One such exception
is the emergency doctrine, or the concept of exigent circum
stances. 26
A judicial barrier to forcible and warrantless entries into the
home by police officers has been established by requiring the pros
ecution to justify its exemption from the warrant requirement. 27

19. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979); accord, Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448
U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-93 (1980); Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 148-49 (1978).
20. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 585-90; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 561, 565 (1976) (dictum); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 389
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (en bane); Mascolo, The Duration of Emergency Searches: The In
vestigative Search and the Issue of Re-entry, 55 N.D. L. REV. 7, 8-9 (1979); see
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978); United States v. United States Dist.
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). See also Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 363, in which
the author noted, "Indisputably, forcible entries by officers into a person's home ...
are the aboriginal subject of the fourth amendment and the prototype of the
'searches' and 'seizures' that it covers."
21. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-30 (1886); Amsterdam, supra note 15, at
363. For historical background of the amendment, see Entick v. Carrington, 19 How
ell St. Tr. 1029, 1063-74 (C.P. 1765), which had a pronounced influence upon the ev
olution and enactment of the fourth amendment. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at
626-27, 630.
22. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 585-90.
23. [d.; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561, 565(1976) (dic
tum).
24. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 586 (footnote omitted); see Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
25. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
26. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 575-76,590; Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 392-93, 394 (1978).
27. United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 424 (2d Cir.), cen. denied, 439 V.S.
913 (1978); State v.Olson, 287 Or. 157, __, 598 P.2d 670, 674 (1979) (en bane); see
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 V.S. 385, 390-91 (1978); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34
(1970) (applying rule to warrantless searches); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
762 (1969) (applying rule to warrantless searches).
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Moreover, the prosecution has the burden of demonstrating the ex
istence of exigent circumstances. 28 These barriers protect the
heightened privacy interests in the home and prevent the warrant
exception from swallowing the general rule. The effect of this bur
den, however, may vary according to the situs of the court. For ex
ample, the court in Dorman v. United States 29 contended that a
"heavy" burden must be met to excuse a warrant requirement. 30
Conversely, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Reed,31 simply
noted that the burden of justifying the exemption must be "reason
able. "32 In view of the strong privacy interests associated with the
home,33 the Donnan approach is preferable to the Reed standard.
It should, therefore, be endorsed by the courts 34 to prevent abuses
of the emergency exception to the warrant requirement.
The difficulty in defining an emergency also may serve as a
barrier to warrantless entries. In general, the emergency doctrine
is a flexible concept which, like the concept of reasonableness, is
not subject to a precise definition. An emergency is not a static
concept; it may pertain to a myriad of factual situations. 35 Its es
sence is a compelling sense of urgency that tolerates no delay and

28. United States v. Kane, 637 F.2d 974, 979 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 1979), een. denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980). See
United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 4( 44 (1st Cir. 1980) (government acknowledged
burden).
29. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en bane).
30. [d. at 392.
31. 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), een. denied, 439 U.S. 913 (1978).
32. [d. at 424.
33. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
34. In fact, the Seventh Circuit has recently done so. United States v. Acevedo,
627 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1980). The Second Circuit apparently has followed the
Dorman approach. See United States v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507, 531 (2d Cir. 1980)
(relying upon Payton). The validity of a warrantless arrest is an important issue since
it determines the initial legality of the search conducted incidental to the arrest un
der the Chimel rule. See Chime!. v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). If the ar
rest is illegal, then according to Chimel, the search conducted incident to the arrest
is also invalidated. See generally United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950);
United States v. Williams, 604 F.2d 1102, 1123 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Reed, 572 F.2d at 425.
35. See United States v. Velasquez, 626 F.2d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 1980); Dorman
v. United States, 435 F.2d at 392; Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.
Cir.) (Burger, J., concurring) (dictum), cat. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); Mascolo, su
pra note 20, at 12-13. In fact, the exigencies which will justify a warrantless arrest
may differ from those which will sanction a warrantless search. Commonwealth v.
Forde, 367 Mass. 798,805-06, 329 N.E.2d 717, 722 (1975); Laasch v. State, 84 Wis.
2d 587, 594-95, 267 N.W.2d 278, 283 (1978). For a summary of the criteria exempting
the need for a search warrant, see Mascolo, supra note 20, at 13-14.
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necessitates an immediate response. 36 Courts use the following fac
tors to determine whether exigent circumstances exist: (1) The
gravity of the offense involved; (2) whether a reasonable basis exists
for believing that the suspect is armed; (3) a clear showing of prob
able cause, including reasonably trustworthy evidence, to establish
that the suspect committed the offense in question; (4) strong rea
son to believe that the suspect will be located within the premises
being entered; (5) a likelihood of escape unless apprehension is
quickly effected; and (6) the peaceful circumstances surrounding
the officers' entry.37 The last element bears on the reasonableness
of the law enforcement officers' conduct and attitude. 38 These cri
teria are generally referred to as the Donnan standards or analysis
since they were first articulated by the United States Court of Ap
peals for the District of Columbia in Donnan v. United States. 39 In
fact, Dorman requires scrutiny of an additional factor: Whether the
entry is made in the daytime or at night. This time element affects
the exigent circumstance analysis since it tends to show whether
procuring a warrant might have entailed unnecessary delay and
whether police conduct was reasonable under the fourth amend
36. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978); United States v. Adams,
621 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir.
1978); Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280, 1294 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488
F.2d 4, 8 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974); Dorman v. United States,
435 F.2d at 390-91, 393, 396; Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.)
(Burger, J., concurring) (dictum), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); People v. Ramey,
16 Cal. 3d 263, 276, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637 (en banc), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976); State v. Lloyd, 606 P.2d 913, 918 & n.5 (Hawaii 1980)
(per curiam); Mascolo, supra note 20, at 12-15. See generally Kelder & Statman, The
Protective Sweep Doctrine: Recurrent Questions Regarding the Propriety of
Searches Conducted Contemporaneously with an Arrest on or Near Private Prem
ises, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 973 (1979); Note, Warrantless Entnj to Arrest: A Practi
cal Solution to a Fourth Amendment Problem, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 655; Comment,
Forcible Entry to Effect a Warrantless Arrest-The Eroding Protection of the Cas
.
tle, 82 DICK. L. REV. 167 (1977).
- 37. United States v. Kulcsar, 586 F.2d 1283, 1287 (8th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Reed, 572 F.2d at 424; United States v. Shye,492 F.2d 886, 891 (6th Cir. 1974);
Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d at 392-93; State v. Jones, 274 N.E.2d 273, 275-76
(Iowa 1979); see Huotari v. Vanderport, 380 F. Supp. 645, 650 (D. Minn. 1974).
An armed suspect may be included within the type of exigency created when
harm to officers or innocent bystanders seems imminent. For recognition of this cate
gory, see United States v. Velasquez, 626 F.2d 314, 317-18 (3d Cir. 1980).
38. By announcing their identity and mission, the police will afford the suspect
an opportunity to surrender without violence, and thus avoid invading the privacy of
the home. Dorman V. United States, 435 F.2d at 393; see State v. Jones, 274 N.W.2d
at 276 (Iowa 1979).
39. 435 F.2d at 385.
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ment. Moreover, the time of day may potentially affect the ade
quacy of probable cause to believe that the suspect will be located
in the place entered. 40 Thus, "particular concern over. . . reason
ableness [stems from nighttime entries]. "41 A higher degree of prob
able cause may be needed to establish both the suspect's guilt and
his presence in the place entered than that necessary for daytime
entries. 42
Although the Donnan criteria generally are endorsed by the
courts,43 they are criticized by some commentators. Professor
LaFave, for example, doubts that the Donnan criteria are sound. 44
He questions whether law enforcement officers will be able to con
duct themselves within constitutional restraints if they are guided
by rules which necessitate on-the-scene assessments of imprecise
and often competing factors. In short, the preservation of fourth
amendment interests will not be served by imposing upon the po
lice a code of conduct that is too sophisticated to be applied prop
erly and in good faith with any reasonable degree of consistency.
This argument, however, overlooks the fact that most of the
standards will have been satisfied before the police enter the sus
pect's residence. Surely the first four standards45 will have been
determined prior to the time the police arrive at the residence.
Moreover, in a number of instances the fifth standard also will
have been met prior to arrival. 46 More fundamentally, Professor
LaFave~s assessment ignores the realities of the situation. The es
sence of an emergency, which is the pressing need for quick ac
tion, often will arise only after arrival. At that point the situation is
in its most fluid, and potentially most dangerous, stage. 47 Therefore,
the Donnan standards are good, if not perfect, objective criteria by
which to judge police conduct, especially since most of the
standards can be satisfied by the police before they enter the sus
pect's residence.
40.

[d. at 393.

41.

[d.

42. [d.; see United States v. Williams, 604 F.2d 1l02, 1122 n.1O (8th Cir. 1979).
See also Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1958).
43. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 587; United States v. Kulcsar, 586
F.2d 1283, 1287 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir.
1978).
44. .2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 6.1, at 390 (1978).
45. See text accompanying note 37, supra.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980).
47. See, e.g., Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d at 388, 393-94.

394

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:387

The courts, while recognizing the Dorman standards as valid,
have refused to adhere to them blindly. Some courts, while willing
to consider and even to utilize the Dorman approach, have not ap
plied it rigidly to every case. For example, the First Circuit, while
acknowledging the value of "the Donnan analysis," has refused to
apply it "as a pass or fail checklist for determining exigency. "48
Rather, the First Circuit examines all the facts in order to deter
mine whether a compelling need for immediate or prompt action
existed. "The ultimate test," in the words of the court, "is whether
there is such a compelling necessity for immediate action as will
not brook the delay of obtaining a warrant. "49 Thus, the Donnan
factors have been viewed as flexible guidelines that are not entitled
to "condition precedent" status, and the reasonableness of an
emergency entry has been assessed in terms of all the circum
stances "bearing upon the exigencies of the situation. "50
This totality of the circumstances approach is sensible, for it
places a premium on the realities of the situations confronting law
enforcement officers just prior to and at the moment of entry. Al
though almost every emergency is unique and must be determined
on an ad hoc basis,51 each has one element in common with all the
others: A compelling need for qUick action. An emergency is a
fluid situation fraught with danger. It does not lend itself to delib
eration. Within its framework, time is of the essence. The police
often will be required to make snap judgments with no more sup
port for their decisions than their experience and sound instincts.
To subject emergency situations to deliberation would heighten the
risk of danger to officer and bystander. 52 Although a warrantless
and forcible entry represents a serious intrusion into the sanctity of
the home, it is necessary when there is reason to believe that
48. United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1980).
49. Id.
50. State V. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112, 118 (N.D. 1979). Accord, United States V.
Jones, 635 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir. 1980) (gravity of offense not "an absolute test"
for presence of exigent circumstances, in that such determination "ultimately de
pends on the unique facts of each controversy"); United States V. Acevedo, 627 F.2d
68, 70 (7th Cir. 1980); United States V. Boyd, 496 F. Supp. 25, 28-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
The Boyd court stated that the presence of danger may justify an immediate official
response, even though the element of flight has not been satisfied. Id.
51. See United States V. Morrow, 541 F.2d 1229, 1232 (7th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 933 (1977); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 276, 545
P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637 (en bane), cert.denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976).
52. See Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 -(D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J., con
curring) (dictum), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); People v. Solario, 19 Cal. 3d 760,
764, 566 P.2d 627, 629, 139 Cal. Rptr. 725, 727 (1977).
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alternative courses of action may result in violence, escape, or de
struction of evidence. Thus, the presence of exigent circumstances
must be determined on the basis of the facts known to the officers
at the time of the entry. 53
Accordingly, if subsequent events demonstrate that law en
forcement officers had sufficient time and opportunity to seek a
warrant, that will be strong evidence that an emergency did not ex
ist, but it will not be controlling. 54 What will be determinative of
the issue of exigency is the reasonableness of the officers' percep
tion that a situation was fluid and potentially volatile. If a reason
able assessment of the situation dictates the conclusion that swift,
responsive action is required, or probably will be required on a
moment-to-moment basis, the officers will be justified in acting
without a warrant, even though facts subsequently learned indicate
that the emergency was more apparent than real. 55
The fundamental consideration affecting the reasonableness of
warrantless entry for arrest is whether the circumstances con
fronting the officers renders timely resort to the warrant process
infeasible. 56 This issue must be resolved on an ad hoc basis since it
implicates a myriad of variables. 57 The Dorman analysis will con

53. United States v. Kane, 637 F.2d 974, 979 (3d Cir. 1981); People v. Ramey,
16 Cal. 3d 263, 276, '545 P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 C~d. Rptr. 629, 637 (en bane), eert.
denied, 429 U.S. 929 \ (1976); People V. Stephens, 18 Ill. App. 3d 812, 821, 310
N.E.2d 755, 759 (1st Dist. 1974) (existence of exigent circumstances justifies exemp
'tion from requirement 6f announcement of authority and purpose prior to forcible
entry); State V. Page, 27TN.W.2d 112, U8 (N.D. 1979).
54. See People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 276-77, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 637 (en bane), eert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976); Commonwealth v. Forde,
367 Mass. 798,807,329 N.E.2d 717, 723 (1975).
55. See United States V. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 1979), eert.
denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980); United States V. Kulcsar, 586 F.2d 1283, 1286 (8th Cir.
1978). See also Wayne V. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J.,
concurring) (dictum), eert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d
486, 489 (Del. 1967); State V. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 580, 409 A.2d 1134,
1139 (1979), eert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980) (reasonable basis for belief of emer
gency is all that is required).
56. See Mincey V. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978); Vale V. Louisiana, 399
U.S. 30, 35 (1970); United States V. Acevedo, 627 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1978); Wayne V. United States, 318 F.2d
205, 212 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J., concurring) (dictum), eert. denied, 375 U.S. 860
(1963); People V. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 276, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr.
629, 637 (en bane), eert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976); State V. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112,
118 (N.D. 1979).
57. See United States V. Acevedo, 627 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Morrow, 541 F.2d 1229, 1232 (7th Cir. 1976) (en bane) (per curiam), eert. denied,
430 U.S. 933 (1977); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger,
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tribute to this determination, but it should not be viewed as a con
dition precedent to a finding of exigency under the fourth amend
ment. Ultimately, the courts should approach this issue with an
understanding of the particular circumstances confronting the offi
cers in light of their experience and their assessment of the situa
tion. It is difficult to convey to an impartial judicial officer the
sense of urgency that pervades an emergency. The Dorman ap
proach is a useful tool in bridging this gap, but it should not be
used as a substitute for a critical examination of the circumstances
surrounding a warrantless entry in light of the officers' experience
and instinctive knowledge. 58

J., concurring) (dictum), eert. denied, .375 U.S. 860 (196.3); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal.
.3d 26.3, 276, 545 P.2d 1.3.3.3, 1.341, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 6.37 (en bane), eert. denied, 429
U.S. 9.39 (1976). For example, a law enforcement officer, in "hot pursuit" of a fleeing
suspect, may effect a warrantless arrest in the home of the suspect. United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S . .38, 42-4.3 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298"99 (1967).
An officer may also take into custody a dangerous, or escaping, suspect, on the basis
of probable cause to believe that the suspect is within the premises when time is of
the essence and recourse to a warrant is impracticable. United States v. Reed, 572
F.2d at 424; Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d at 392-93; Mascolo, supra note 20, at
13; see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978); Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280,
1294, 1296 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976). Additionally, officers will be permitted to take prompt action to pro
tect life and property, to apprehend a suspect in the process of committing an of
fense, to prevent the suspect's flight, and to preserve evidence from actual or immi
nent destruction or loss. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 392-93, 394; C.M.
Leasing, Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 361-62 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concur~
ring) (dictum); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970); United States v. Jabara, 618
F.2d 1319, 1324 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir.
1979), eert. denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980); United States v. Estese, 479 F.2d 1273, 1274
(6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); People v. Solario, 19 Cal. 3d 760, 763-64, 566 P.2d 627,
629, 139 Cal. Rptr. 725, 727 (1977). Although the hot-pursuit, fleeing-suspect, and
destruction-of-evidence cases are the "most common examples of exigent circum
stances," United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d at 739, this list is by no means exhaust
ive. For further examples, see Mascolo, supra note 20, at 13-14.
58. See United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 1979), eert.
denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980) (the court stated that if a reasonable assessment of the
situation dictates a conclusion that swift responsive action is required, or will be re
quired on a moment-to-moment basis, the police may act without a warrant, even
though it is subsequently learned that the emergency was more apparent that real);
United Sates v. Kulcsar, 586 F.2d 1283, 1286 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 10 (9th Cir. 1973), eert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974);
Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J., concurring) (dic
tum), eert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 276, 545
P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637 (en bane), eert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976);
State v. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112, 118 (N.D. 1979). See also United States v. Manning, ,
448 F.2d 992 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearing (en bane), 448 F.2d 997, 1000-02 (2d Cir.),
eert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971).
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ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC CRITERIA

Certain circumstances are considered to provide law enforce
ment officers with sufficient facts to support a warrantless search or
arrest. These include the potential for flight, the presence of weap
ons, the destruction or loss of evidence, and the belief, based upon
probable cause, that a suspect is present in his home. Once again,
however, the existence of an exigency may vary according to fac
tors within these broad categories.
A.

The Element of Flight

An officer's perception that flight or escape is likely should
constitute adequate probable cause to justify a warrantless search or
arrest. In other words, the police should have reason to believe
that an imminent escape is likely before they may act without a
warrant. 59 The mere possibility that an individual in his home
might "make a break" or otherwise attempt an escape, however, is
insufficient to give rise to exigent circumstances. If less than proba
ble cause were required, a warrantless entry to arrest would be
justified any time law enforcement officers announced their pres
ence and a suspect did not promptly come out of his home. This
would vitiate the fourth amendment barriers since "The practical ef
fect of this would be to all but eliminate the requirement that
there be exigent circumstances in order to justify a warrantless en
try to arrest. "60 Therefore, in the absence of probable cause that an
For a critical assessment of the Dorman approach, see Donnino & Girese, Exi
gent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 ALBANY L. REV. 90, 104-06,
112-13 (1980).
59. United States v. Acevedo, 627 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1980) (imminent flight,
coupled with lack of time to secure all possible exits from apartment building);
United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
934 (1980); State v. Rudolph, 369 So. 2d 1320, 1326 (La. 1979), State V. Page, 277
N.W.2d 112, 118-19 (N.D. 1979); State v. Peller, 287 Or. 255, _ , 598 P.2d 684, 689
(1979); see Ker V. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963) (Bremian, J., concurring & dis
senting); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958) (dictum); United States V.
Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978); United
States V. Easter, 552 F.2d 230, 234 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977);
United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 8-9, 11 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 970 (1974); Dorman V. United States, 435 F.2d at 393.
60. State V. Peller, 287 Or. 255, _ , 598 P.2d 684, 689 (1979) (a suspect who
remains in his house and does not respond to the police has not demonstrated an in
tent to escape that will justify an emergency response); see United States V.
Velasquez, 626 F.2d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 1980) (mere failure to respond promptly to an
announcement of identity, coupled with presence of undercover agent in home,
negates an assumption of imminent flight).
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escape is imminent, the police should set up surveillance of the
premises and should seek a warrant. 61 For example, the mere
sound of running feet coming from within a residence after police
demand entry is insufficient by itself to establish exigent circum
stances when there is no indication that escape is likely, or that the
suspect knows of the presence of the police, or when there is no
reasonable basis for believing that the suspect is armed and thus
"presents a danger to the safety of the investigating officers. "62
Conversely, the sound of someone running inside in response to
both a police announcement of authority and demand for entry is
sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect is at
tempting to escape. 63 Moreover, a warrantless entry may be
upheld simply by a knock and an announcement of identity when
those within the premises already know of the officers' authority
and purpose and sounds of running and scuflling are coming from
the residence. 64
Finally, an exigency may arise from a combination of the time
of entry and the accessibility of a rapid means of escape. For exam
ple, when a suspect's home is visited at night, his automobile is
parked in the yard, and access to the automobile from the resi
dence is facilitated by the darkness of night, forcible entry after the
announcement of authority and purpose is justified. 65 Thus, the
time of entry may affect not only the suspect's reaction to the entry
but also the reasonableness of the officers' actions.
B.

The Presence of Weapons

The threat of being confronted with an armed suspect is up
permost in the law officer's mind every time he enters a home to
make an arrest. Therefore, the potential for violence is present in
every case and must be assessed on an ad hoc basis. While there is
no hard-and-fast rule governing police entries into homes, certain
standards can be applied to accommodate both the individual's pri
vacy rights and the safety of the police and innocent bystanders.

61. State v. Peller, 287 Or. 255, _ , 598 P.2d 684, 689 (1979).
62. United States v. Williams, 604 F.2d 1102, 1123 (8th Cir. 1979); see Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 482-84 (1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.
301,309-13 (1958).
63. State v. Rudolph, 369 So. 2d 1320, 1326 (La. 1979).
64. United States v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearing (en
bane), 448 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir.), eert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971); see United
States v. Kulcsar, 586 F.2d 1283, 1286 (8th Cir. 1978).
65. United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 348, 350 (5th Cir. 1978).
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Safety is not threatened simply because a suspect owns a
weapon. Ownership of a gun does not mean that it will be used
against police officers seeking entry into a home. Mere ownership
or legal possession of a firearm will not create an exigency in the
absence of a reasoned belief by the officers, supported by specific
facts, that the weapon will be used against them. 66 For example,
the fact that a residence contains both weapons and an elaborate
system of security devices will not justify an emergency entry
when there is no prior history of violence on the part of the occu
pant and when the occupant indicates to the police his willingness
to leave the premises and to submit peacefully to arrest. 67
Unless there is evidence that the suspect has used a firearm
recently in the commission of a crime,68 possession or ownership of
a dangerous weapon, without more, will not reasonably support the
belief that a suspect poses a threat to the arresting officers or that
he is armed at the time of apprehension. 69 In essence, unless the
police have probable cause to believe that the suspect is armed,70
the suspect's ownership or possession of a firearm will not legiti
mize an emergency entry supposedly based on an urgent need to
disarm the subject and to protect the arresting officers. 71
Apparently, courts have distinguished between mere posses
66. People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 878-79, 512 P.2d 1208, 1213, 109 Cal. Rptr.
304, 309 (1973) (en bane); People v. Vollheim, 87 Cal. App. 3d 538, 541, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 837,839 (5th Dist. 1978).
.
67. People v. Vollheim, 87 Cal. App. 3d 538, 543, 151 Cal. Rptr. 837, 839-40
(5th Dist. 1978).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 635 F.2d 1357, 1360-61 (8th Cir. 1980);
Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1966), eert. denied, 388 U.S.
922 (1967).
69. United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 717 (9th Cir. 1976).
70. See United States v. Kane, 637 F.2d 974, 979-80 (3d Cir. 1981); United
States v. Jones, 635 F.2d 1357, 1360-61 (8th Cir. 1980); Gilbert v. United States, 366
F.2d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir, 1966), eert. "denied, 388 U.S. 922 (1967). One court had
contended that in the absence of recent criminal use of a firearm, probable cause
to believe that a suspect is armed is insufficient to constitute an emergency. State v.
Olson, 287 Or. 157, _ , 598 P.2d 670, 674 (1979) (ell bane); see People v. Ramey,
16 Cal. 3d 263, 276, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637 (ell bane), eert.
dellied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976). This approach, however, clearly is erroneous since an
armed suspect is a dangerous suspect, and his presence should be sufficient to justifY
immediate action. See United States v. Whitney, 633 F.2d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 1980);
Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (ell bane); Gilbert v.
United States, 366 F.2d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1966), eert. dellied, 388 U.S. 922 (1967).
The recent use of a firearm should reinforce the compelling need for urgent action,
and not be the sine qua 11011 of such action. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
298-99 (1967); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d at 393.
71. United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 717 (9th Cir. 1976).
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sion or ownership, on the one hand, and prior use of a weapon, on
the other hand, in assessing exigent circumstances. Thus, the pos
session of a firearm coupled with its recent use in the commission
of a crime of violence72 will qualify as an emergency justifYing
warrantless entry.73 This approach is valid for two reasons. First, it
accommodates the privacy rights of individuals who merely possess
weapons. Second, it recognizes the need to protect police and in
nocent bystanders by allowing emergency action when a suspect
has demonstrated a history of using a weapon.

C.

The Destruction or Loss of Evidence

The destruction or loss of evidence, not discussed in the Dor
man analysis of emergency, is clearly a critical circumstance to be
considered in determining the existence of an exigency. As with
other exigent circumstances, this standard should be governed by
. the officer's belief, based upon probable cause, that evidence will
be lost or destroyed unless immediate action is taken. Once again,
analysis often will hinge on events arising subsequent to the arrival
of the officer at the suspect's home. Satisfaction of this standard
therefore should require a reasoned belief by the police, in light of
their knowledge and experience, and in particular in light of their
assessment of the situation immediately prior to entry, that de
struction of evidence is likely to occur if they delay their entry.
For example, the sound of someone running inside the residence
in response to a police announcement of authority and demand for
entry is sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that a suspect,
whom the officer is investigating on the basis of probable cause, is
attempting to destroy evidence. 74 Prompt action is also justified
72. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967); State v. Olson, 287 Or. 157,
_ , 598 P.2d 670, 674 (1979) (en bane); see Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923,
931-32 (9th Cir. 1966), eer!. denied, 388 U.S. 922 (1967). The same possession and
use analysis pertains to explosives. See, e.g., United States v. Picariello, 568 F.2d
222, 226 (1st Cir. 1978) (permitting agents to gain entry to secure premises pending
arrival of search warrant when there was probable cause to believe that dynamite
bombs, some of which had been used recently, might explode, injuring innocent per
sons).
73. In this setting, the presence of weapons will be germane to the gravity of
the offense involved under the Dorman analysis. See notes 35-42 supra.
74. State v. Mariano, 152 Conn. 85, 97-98, 203 A.2d 305, 312 (1964), eer!.
denied, 380 U.S. 943 (1965); State v. Gallo, 20 Wash. App. 717, 723-24, 582 P.2d 558,
563, (1978); see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring &
dissenting); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958) (dictum); United States
v. Gomez, 633 F.2d 999, 1008 (2d Cir. 1980), een, denied, 101 S. Ct. 1695 (1981)
(scurrying of feet, water running through pipes, and flushing toilet are sufficient to
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under the emergency exception when officers observe that evi
dence is being removed. 75
The fact that particular kinds of evidence readily lend them
selves to destruction is not sufficient in itself to establish an exigent
circumstance. 76 Other factors, however, when combined with the
readily disposable nature of the evidence, may justifY warrantless
entry.77 Not only must the evidence sought be easy to destroy or
conceal, but reasonable cause to believe that the evidence will be
destroyed is needed. 78 Thus, when the evidence "consists of rela
tively small amounts of contraband and where a nearby bathroom
or kitchen provides for easy disposal," law enforcement officers
may gain lawful entry without a warrant. 79 Additionally, when the
police have probable cause to believe that the suspect is expecting
their arrival, the readily disposable nature of the evidence will sus
tain an emergency entry. 80
A further circumstance for warrantless entry exists when a

establish exigent circumstances); United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 717 (9th Cir.
1976). The courts must be vigilant, however, against any attempts by law
enforcement officers to circumvent the warrant requirement by inducing reactive exi
gent circumstances through the systematic terrorization of the occupants' of a resi
dence "in the hope of hearing telltale signs of commotion." United States v. Gomez,
633 F .2d at 1006.
Conversely, no exigency exists when prior to. entry the officer does not have a
substantial basis for believing that incriminating evidence is actually present, when
sounds indicating the destruction of evidence are absent, and when a fellow officer,
acting in the capacity of an undercover agent and present within the residence, gives
no signal or cry that evidence is being destroyed. United States v. Velasquez, 626
F.2d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 1980). And, a mere "fear or apprehension that evidence will
be destroyed" is insufficient to demonstrate an exigency. United States v. Levine,
500 F. Supp. 777, 780-81 (W.D.N.Y. 1980).
75. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 361-62 (1977) (Burger,
C.]., concurring). The Court held, however, that observing the removal of evidence
more than one day prior to entry is too distant in time to qualify as an exigent cir
cumstance. [d. at 358-59.
76. See People v. Ouellette, 78 Ill. 2d 511, 519-20, 401 N.E.2d 507, 510-11
(1979); People v. Stephens, 18 Ill. App. 3d 817, 823, 310 N.E.2d 755, 760 (1st Dist.
1974); Commonwealth v. Newman, 429 Pa. 441, 448, 240 A.2d 795, 798 (1968); Note,
Police Practices and the Threatened Destruction of Tangible Evidence, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1465, 1494 (1971). But see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963) (plurality
opinion).
77. See United States v. Blank, 251 F. Supp. 166, 174-75 (N.D. Ohio 1966);
State v. Mendoza, 104 Ariz. 395, 399-400, 454 P.2d 140, 144-45 (1969) (en bane); Peo
ple v. Conner, 78 Ill. 2d 525, 532-33, 401 N.E.2d 513, 517 (1979).
78. People v. Ouellette, 78 Jll. 2d 511, 520, 401 N.E.2d 507, 511 (1979); 2 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 44, § 4.8, at 134-35.
79. State v. Clarke, 242 So. 2d 791, 795 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 4th Dist. 1970).
80. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40-41 (1963) (plurality opinion).
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magistrate is not readily available to issue a warrant. For example,
a warrant is not required when the premises are situated in a re
mote locale and the officers have reason to believe \ that the sub
stantial delay required to obtain a warrant will result in the re
moval or loss of evidence. 81
It is also relevant that certain evidence, by its very nature,
will be lost or destroyed if not submitted to immediate examina
tion. Blood stains typify this kind of evidence that generally is fo
rensic in nature. Forensic evidence is to be distinguished from
other forms of evidence, such as narcotics, which, though small in
size and easy to discard, are difficult to destroy. Therefore, when
the police are confronted with a situation involving evidence of the
forensic kind, they may be permitted to effect an emergency en
try. 82

D.

Probable Cause that Suspect is Present

Probable cause to believe that a suspect is present in his home
is a standard that deserves special consideration because of its po
tential for abuse. Belief that a suspect is present is always a prereq
uisite for emergency entry83 and is crucial to the concept of reason
ableness under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement. Moreover, it may be required when the suspect is
expected to flee, such as when a suspect returns home after
committing an offense "to get his affairs together" before at
tempting an escape. 84
The Donnan standard does not require probable cause per se;
rather, it dictates a "strong reason to believe that the suspect is in
the premises being entered. "85 It does not establish criteria for
such belief. In the usual arrest situation, however, the home is the
most likely place to look for a suspect, at least initially.86 The ini
tial likelihood of presence probably does not satisfy the "strong rea
81. United States v. Gray, 626 F.2d 102, 105 (9th CiT. 1980). In Gray, the
agents were unable to locate the federal magistrate, and the nearest state judge re
sided approximately 55 miles away. Icy and hazardous roads caused by a continuing
snowstorm made travel impracticable. Id. at 104.
82. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 406 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring
& dissenting) (by implication) (blood on floor).
83. Probable cause to believe that the suspect is in his home is also a prerequi
site for entry to execute an arrest warrant. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 603.
84. See United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 739 (3d CiT. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980).
85. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d at 393 (footnote omitted).
86. See id. at 400 (Wright, J., concurring & dissenting).
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son to believe" test of whether an individual will be found. The
likelihood of presence, in this setting, amounts to nothing more
than a groundless assumption. In a modern and increasingly mobile
society, and particularly in large urban areas where so much
violent crime is committed, it simply cannot be assumed with a
"strong" degree of reliability that an individual will be at home at
any particular hour of the day or night. Accordingly, "strong reason
to believe" should require more than a belief based upon an
unsubstantiated assumption. The standard should be based on
articulable and reasonably trustworthy information.
Nevertheless, the home is a good place to initiate a search for
a suspect. In the likely event that someone other than the suspect
opens the door in response to a police knock, an inquiry should be
conducted at the entrance to learn of the suspect's whereabouts.
Probable or strong cause is lacking if the police receive a negative
response and nothing else transpires at the entrance that points
to a reasonable likelihood of the suspect's presence. The officers
then should not be permitted to cross the threshold without a war
rant. The Dorman model of probable cause is satisfied, however, if
events develop establishing a trustworthy basis for believing that
the suspect is within the premises. 87 For example, a noise or
sound of running from within, indicating an attempted concealment
or flight in progress, may constitute such an event. 88 Thus, the
right to be secure in the home against unreasonable police conduct
is not violated since police action is based upon specific facts
constituting probable cause.
87. Id. at 392-93.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehear
ing ell ballc, 448 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir.), cert. dellied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971); Dorman
v. United States, 435 F.2d at 394; State v. Rudolph, 369 So. 2d 1320, 1326 (La. 1979).
See also United States v. Kulcsar, 586 F.2d 1283, 1286 (8th Cir. 1978) (applying
standard when agents had reasonable belief that defendant was present in home).
Moreover, information from a reliable informant, supported by the presence of an in
dividual of the suspect's race and gender, who opens the front door and then quickly
ducks back inside in response to the approach of the police, also may qualifY as an
event supporting probable cause to enter. See United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d
735, 737, 739 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980) (applying standard to
the presence of a suspect in the home of a third party).
The Donnall court would have been on firm ground in finding probable cause
for presence, if it had relied on the belief of the officers that a noise from within,
after a negative response at the door to the residence, pointed to concealment. In
stead, the court relied on a prima facie assumption that "a man [most likely will be)
at home after 10 p.m." 435 F.2d at 393; see id. at 388. In fact, the court implicitly
conceded that it was not on firm footing because the police had "no special knowl
edge" that the suspect was at home. Id. at 393.
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UNANNOUNCED ENTRY

In addition to the requirement of probable cause, the
unannounced entry doctrine is a major constraint on the unlimited
intrusion into the home by law enforcement officers. From earliest
times, the common law has required that, before a law enforcement
officer may break open the door of a house to make an arrest, he
must first state his authority and purpose for demanding admis
sion. 89 When the occupant assents, the officer is permitted to gain
entry "with reasonable dispatch" after announcement. 90 If there is
no response to the announcement after a reasonable period, per
mission to enter will be deeined constructively denied. 91 The rule
appears to have been announced first in Semayne's Case 92 and has
been codified by statute. 93 Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in
Ker v. California,94 apparently has incorporated the doctrine into

89. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-08 (1957); State v. Rauch, 99
Idaho 586, 592, 586 P.2d 671, 677 (1978).
Many cases hold that the rule does not mandate any set form of expression. Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 48 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting); United
States v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearing en bane, 448 F.2d 997,
1001 (2d Cir.), eert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971); Curtis' Case, Fost. 135, 137, 168
Eng. Rep. 67, 68 (1756). The rule, however, does "require notice in the form of an
express announcement by the officers of their purpose for demanding admission."
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. at 309 (emphasis added). This means that the
homeowner or occupant must be given notice that the officers are acting" 'under a
proper authority.''' Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 48 (Brennan, J., concurring & dis
senting) (quoting Curtis' Case, Fost. 135, 137, 168 Eng.. Rep. at 68); United States v.
Manning, 448 F.2d at 1001.
The announcement will not be required at every place of entry; one proper an
nouncement will be sufficient. United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 10
(9th Cir. 1973), eert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974); United States v. Tirinkian, 502 F.
Supp. 620, 629 (D.N.D. 1980).
90. See United States v. Easter, 552 F.2d 230, 234 (8th Cir.), eert. denied, 434
U.S. 844 (1977); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 12 (9th CiT. 1973),
eert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974); United States v. Woodring, 444 F.2d 749, 751 (9th
Cir. 1971) (one-minute interval sufficient when officers had reasonable cause to be
lieve someone was within).
91. See United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 11 (9th CiT. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974). The reasonableness of a wait after announcement
cannot be mechanically determined and must be assessed in light of the circum
stances of each particular case. State v. Mariano, 152 Conn. 85, 94, 203 A.2d 305, 311
(1964), eert. denied, 380 U.S. 943 (1965).
92. 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195-96 (K.B. 1603); see Miller v.
United States, 357 U.S. 301, 308 (1957).
93. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976) (applying principle to execution of search
warrants).
94. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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the fourth amendment to protect "the security of a householder
[against police invasions] .."95
Although the announcement requirement was initially moti
vated by a desire to prevent damage and inconvenience to the
homeowner,96 it is now perceived as a means of protecting the pri
vacy and sanctity of the home97 and as a means of reducing vio
lence and harm to both officer and homeowner.98 Thus, the rule is
"deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging
application, "99 especially- since it expresses "the reverence of the
law for the individual's right of privacy in his house. "100
The announcement requirement promotes two privacy inter
ests. First, it protects the homeowner from the outrage of having
his residence suddenly and violently broken into without either no
95. [d. at 53 (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting); see United States v.
Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488
F.2d 4, 9 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974); United States v. Manning, .
448 F.2d 992, rev'd on rehearing en bane, 448 F.2d 997, 1001-02 (2d Cir.), cerl.
denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971); State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586, 592, 586 P.2d 671, 677
(1978); Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139, 146 (1970); see Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. at 37-41 (plurality opinion) (by implication). See also Sabbath
v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 591 n.8 (1968). Contra, People v. Wolgemuth, 69 IlL
2d 154, 164-66,370 N.E.2d 1067, 1072 (1977), cerl. denied, 436 U.S. 908 (1978).
96. See Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195-96 (KB.
1603). This concern is still pertinent. See, e.g., United States v. Bustamante-Gamez,
488 F.2d 4,9 (9th Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974).
97. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307, 313 (1958), in which the
Court pithily summarized the rationale behind the warrant requirement in the adage
that "a man's house is his castle." [d. at 307; United States v. Bustamante-Gamez,
488 F.2d 4, 11-12 (9th Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974); State v. Rauch,
99 Idaho 586, 592-93, 586 P.2d 671, 677-78 (1978).
98. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589 (1968); Miller v. United States,
357 U.S. 301, 313 n.12 (1958); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460-61
(1948) (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 9
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974); People v. Dumas, 9 CaL 3d 871,
878,512 P.2d 1208, 1213, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304, 309 (1973) (en bane); 2. W. LAFAVE, su
pra note 44, § 6.2, at 397; Note, supra note 76, at 1492-93; Note, supra note 95, at
140-41.
99. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1957). For example, breaking
and entering will extend to breaking down a door, forCing open a chain lock on a
partially open door, opening a locked door by means of a pass key, and opening a
closed but unlocked door. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 590 (1968)
(dictum in part). Thus, the use of force is not indispensable to breaking open a
dwelling to effect a search or an arrest, and the concept of breaking and entering will
be construed broadly to implement constitutional values. [d. at 589. It has not been
applied, however, to a law officer following immediately after a suspect through an
open door. People v. Hyter, 61 App. Div. 2d 990, 991,402 N.Y.S.2d 602, 603-04 (2d
Dept. 1978).
100. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1957) (footnote omitted).
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tice or an opportunity to consent. Second, it serves to reduce the
possibility of embarrassing situations resulting from the unexpected
exposure of intimate or othelWise private activities. 101 Therefore,
in the absence of exigent circumstances, the fourth amendment
prohibits "an unannounced police intrusion into a private home,
with or without an arrest warrant, "102 even if there is probable
cause to support the arrest of a suspect. 103 Waiving the rule of an
nouncement in the presence of an exigency is logical. Among the
exigent circumstances that will justifY a waiver of the announce
ment rule are the presence of an armed suspect, a suspect who
"might resist arrest," or one who poses a danger to others within
the premises. 104 The requirement is inapplicable when the author
ity and purpose of the officers are already known to the person or
persons within;105 when the officers reasonably believe that those

101. United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 11-12 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974); see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 51-52 (Brennan,
J., concurring & dissenting); Note, supra note 76, at 1493-94.
It has been contended that the rule reinforces the dignity of the individual by
guaranteeing him a reasonable degree of control over his own home. Note, supra
note 95, at 153. But, as the Ninth Circuit has pointed out, a homeowner has no right
to deny entry to law officers armed with a warrant or with valid grounds to make a
warrantless entry. Under the rule of announcement, he has, at most, only a relatively
short period of time in which to decide whether he will open his door. United States
v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d at 11.
102. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 47 (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting).
103. Id.; United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 & n.l (6th Cir. 1976); see
Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 588-91 (1968); Miller v. United States, 357
U.S. 301, 308-09, 313 (1958); United States v. Montano, 613 F.2d 147, 152 (6th Cir.
1980) (Edwards, C.J., concurring); United States v. Kulcsar, 586 F.2d 1283, 1285-86
n.2 (8th Cir. 1978); 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976) (applying same rule to execution of
search warrants, as interpreted in Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. at 588-89, Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 482 (1963), and Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.
at 306).
104. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 591 (1968); United States v.
Whitney, 633 F.2d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488
F.2d 4, 12 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974). Among the recognized
dangers is "imminent peril of bodily harm. . . ." Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 47
(Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting); accord, United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d
709, 717 (9th Cir. 1976); State v. Mariano, 152 Conn. 85, 95, 203 A.2d 305, 311
(1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 943 (1965); Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706, 710 (Fla.
1964); see Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. at 591 n.8; Miller v. United States, 357
U.S. 301, 309 (1958) ("peril of bodily harm" sufficient to invoke exemption from re
quirement).
105. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 47 (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting);
United States v. Fluker, .543 F.2d 709, 717 (9th Cir. 1976); Benefield v. State, 160 So.
2d 706, 710 (Fla. 1964); see Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 591 n.8 (1968). In
this setting, the police will not be required to make an announcement since it would
be "a useless gesture." United States v. Nicholas, 319 F.2d 697, 698 (2d Cir.), cert.
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within, as a result of learning of the presence of someone outside,
are attempting to escape or to destroy evidence;106 and when the
officers have reasonable grounds to believe that compliance will
frustrate the arrest, increase their peril, or permit the destruction
of evidence. l07 These exceptions do not abrogate the general rule
requiring announcement, since the prosecutor still has the burden
of proving an exigency. lOS
The rule of announcement affords the homeowner a reasonable
opportunity to comply peaceably with the official demand for en
try. The rule does not, however, provide a complete shield against
lawful official entries. If the homeowner refuses to admit the po
lice, the police are permitted to enter without further delay any
way. Moreover, the need for such refusal is obviated in emergency
situations, even if the situation involves only some indication of ex
igent circumstances. 109 In all these situations, the need for quick
denied, 375 U.S. 933 (1963) (before narcotics agents could knock and make an
nouncement, occupant opened door and, on learning their identity, threw herself on
one of the agents, screaming "police, police").
106. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 47 (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting);
Millerv. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958) (dictum); United States v. Fluker,
543 F.2d 709, 717 (9th Cir. 1976); Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706, 710 (Fla. 1964);
see Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 591 n.8 (1968); United States v. Busta
mante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 12 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974).
107. United States v. Chesher, 640 F.2d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 1981) (fear for
safety must be both sincere and justified); United States v. Kane, 637 F.2d 974, 978-79
(3d Cir. 1981) (noncompliance justified if an officer reasonably believes his life will
be placed in danger); People v. Tribble, 4 Cal. 3d 826, 833, 484 P.2d 589, 593, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 613, 617 (1971) (en bane); see State v. Mariano, 152 Conn. 85, 95,203 A.2d 305,
311 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 943 (1965); Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706, 710
(Fla. 1964); State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586, 590, 586 P.2d 671, 675 (1978).
The Ninth Circuit has argued that entry will be permissible simultaneously with
or shortly after announcement if there is "a likelihood" of attempted resistance, es
cape, destruction of evidence, or harm to someone within the premises, "and if a non
forcible entry is possible...." United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 12 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974). More "specific inferences of exigency"
will be necessary if forcible entry is required. [d. This would appear to place an un
due burden on law enforcement officers for it would hamper them in their efforts to
protect lives, preserve evidence, or prevent flight in the event that non
forcible entry is not readily open to them. Moreover, there is no automatic correlation
between exigency and forcible entry. To the contrary, forcible entry is permissible in
the absence of exigent circumstances, which the court in Bustamante-Gamez itself ap
peared to recognize. See id. In short, forcible entry involving the physical destruction
of property should not be governed exclusively by the degree of exigency involved.
108. See notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
109. United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 12 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974). This relatively low standard has been qualified to require
a substantial showing of exigency. United States v. Chesher, 640 F.2d 1069, 1075 (9th
Cir. 1981). For example, probable cause to believe that the suspect is armed and dan
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pOllce action outweighs the intrusion upon the suspect's privacy
rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Payton Court acknowledged that the privacy of the indi
vidual in his home is the cornerstone of fourth amendment values.
To foster respect for the individual's dignity and inner worth, the
Supreme Court has classified warrantless arrests within a private
residence as "presumptively unreasonable" under the fourth
amendment. llo The warrant requirement, however, is not inviolate
in the home setting. Certain exceptions to the warrant requirement
pertain to arrests on private premises, including that of exigent cir
cumstances. Urgency and the need for immediate action are cen
tral to the existence of an exigent or emergency situation. Thus, in
the face of an exigency, the need to act promptly will take prece
dence over the warrant requirement.
In determining whether law enforcement officers have acted
reasonably when confronted with an alleged emergency, courts
must conduct a realistic assessment of the situation. The courts
should take into consideration all the surrounding circumstances
and the officers' perceptions of those events in the light of their
knowledge and experience. Probable cause should be the common
denominator by which courts judge police activity in an alleged ex
igency., While imprecise conceptually, both the courts and the po
lice are familiar with the concept. Therefore, if upon careful analy
sis a reviewing court concludes that the officers had substantial
reason to believe that they were confronted with a fluid situation
dominated by an atmosphere of urgent necessity, the court should
sustain the officers' decision to act promptly without an arrest war
rant. Conversely, if the court concludes that no substantial basis for
such action existed, then the court should condemn the failure to
obtain a warrant as violative of the suspect's rights under the fourth
amendment. This careful analysis should include an examination of
both the Dorman standards and the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the exigency.
gerous will be sufficient to excuse the need for refusal of admittance. United States v.
Whitney, 633 F.2d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 1980). Conversely, neither status as a convicted
felon nor membership in the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club is sufficient, absent a
showing of propensity by the homeowner for violence or the use of weapons, to justify
noncompliance with the refusal-of-admittance requirement. United States v. Chesher,
640 F.2d at 1073-74 & nn. 3-4.
llO. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 586 (footnote omitted).

